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H e went on to give an example of what he meant:
“The Greek student must think that for the Rector to
send a notice to his village to be read by the priest to
the congregation is much heavier punishment than
mere expulsion from ’the university.”
Twenty-two days later, on January 27, the Minister
of Education announced that as a first measure for
the improvement of the universities and as a manifestation of the government’s concem, 56 members of
their faculties were dismissed-almost half of them
from the university the Premier had so recently exhorted to lead the nation. This measure was necessary,
said the Minister; and it would now be possible to fulfill the govemment’s promise to supply free textbooks
to students. He did not enlarge on the somewhat less
than obvious relationship between the two subjects,
but explained that the delay was unavoidable because
it had taken considerable time to assess “the evidence
and denunciations” in the professors’ personal dossiers
and to determine the cost of the books.
There is no real contradiction between the Premier’s
exhortations and the govemment’s actions. T h e military junta (officially styled the Revolutionary Council)
now governing the kingless Kingdom of Greece has
been interested in the universities from the very beginning of its rule and has indeed already intervened
massively in their life and operation. T h e official record
of more or less open legislative and administrative action which is reviewed here points clearly to the junta’s
goals and concerns, to the channels and possibilities
for action which it has prepared for itself, and to the
use it has made of them. In view of the extent and the
purposes of this intervention, emphasis on the undoubted shortcomings of Greek higher education be.
fore the coup d’ktat of April 21, 1967, is out of place,
for it diverts attention from the more significant features
of the current crisis.

Of the two chief facets of academic freedom, university independence and freedom of expression, the
latter has generally been less secure in Greece. T h e effective limits of expression of political dissent or of unorhodox opinions have tended to be relatively narrow.
Nevertheless, the general trend since the late fifties and
until the April coup had been in the direction of i n
creasing liberalization, in form as well as in substance.
This trend was possible partly because of the autonomy
of the universities and other institutions of higher leaming which has been repeatedly affirmed in their charters
and in the 1952 Constitution. T h e latter, in an article
significantly located in its second part which comprises
the Bill of Rights, requires that institutions of higher
education are to be self-administered under the supervision of the state and that their professors shall be
“civil servants,” and as such protected by tenure and
by definite procedures for appeal against decisions affecting their status. T h e constitution presented by the junta
in July retains most of this language but institutes at
each university the ominous office of “government commissioner” whose jurisdiction is left undefined.
T h e extent to which university autonomy was formally established in Greek law is made evident by the
military regime’s choice of legal form for its measures
concerning the universities. These have generally been
“constituent acts,” that is to say, a special kind of
statute which, in accordance with an untypically realistic quirk of Greek constitutional theory, may amend or
derogate from the Constitution, although not issued
through regular constitutional amendment procedures.
THE

FIRST

T h e first general measure dealing directly with university affairs was Constituent Act V, “concerning the
‘cleansing’ of the universities,” issued in June 1967.
According to it, professors and other faculty members
of institutions of higher education may be suspended
for a six-month period, which may be extended for
another six months, on any of several grounds. Although such “suspension” is not the strict equivalent
of dismissal, past (and present) Greek experience suggests that it is often a preliminary step before dismissal. In fact, most professors suspended under this act
last October were subsequently dismissed in January.
T h e suspension is imposed by ministerial decision, in
which the universities do not participate. No procedure
is provided for a hearing before the decision or for
review after it.
T h e grounds for suspension must be quoted at some
length to capture the flavor of their style-typical of
the military regime’s rhetoric and enactments. Professors may be placed under suspension: (1) if they have
behaved in a manner “incompatible with their function
as public servants and university professors” or generally
inappropriate for university teachers; ( 2 ) if “their acSeptember 1968 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 21

tions and occupations, outside their schools, indicated
not devotion to science and to their position but utilization of these for other ends, not compatible with the
properly understood professorial function, which was
thus left open to comments”; (3) if they were unqualified for their position, or otherwise entered the
university “abnormally”; (4)if “their actions and conduct show that they are not inspired by the appropriate
spirit, compatible with the prevailing social regime,
and by the national ideals.”
W h e n Constituent Act V was made public, it was
widely expected that the govemment would undertake
forthwith a farreaching purge of the universities-as it
did, on the basis of similar legislation, in at l a s t part
of the civil service. However, the act was in fact applied
for the first and last time four months after its issuance,
when 11 professors were suspended. (The January 1968
dismissals rested on a different legal basis.) This delay,
and the limited application of the act, are in a way
typical of the military regime’s attitude and manner.
It has generally supplied itself with far more instruments of control and coercion than it has used-the
main function of such instruments being to provide a
continuing threat and compel compliance or a t least
toleration of the regime’s edicts. In its relationship with
influential individuals, the regime has generally acted
with circumspection and deliberation, bespeaking long
years of training in bureaucratic infighting and intrigue.
Jt thus accepted for a time the services of top-level officials willing to tolerate it-for instance, the heads of the
major financial institutions-forcing them out only
after i t had consolidated its position and no longer
needed the respectability their presence lent it.
THE

OF

f

In late July 1967, new procedures were established
for the widespread purging of the whole of the civil
service. Constituent Act
required all civil servants,
including judges and university professors, to file statements affirming their loyalty to the State. T h e official
forms used inquired as to membership in, or direct or
indirect cooperation with, any organization which
“serves directly or indirectly the aims of the Communist Party,” several left-wing peace groups being named
as illustrations. After review of the statements by the
govemment, through undisclosed procedures, the persons found not to be loyal were to be dismissed. T h e
definition of “disloyalty” in this Act is a miracle of
deliberate vagueness and ambiguity: it covers not only
those who are “motivated by communist ideas” but
also anyone who “in whatsoever manner contributes to
their spreading or praises them” or who “turns against
the prevailing political regime or its fundamental institutions.,, Although this Act purports merely to amend
an already existing law passed at the height of the
civil war, in the late 1940s, the latter was far less vague
and thereby of more restricted application.
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A month later, Constituent Act X lifted the tenure
of judges, professors, and all civil servants for a fourmonth period. ( T h e value of such apparently legalistic
time limitations was clearly illustrated in the spring of
1968, when tenure of judges was again lifted, for a
three-day period this time, and 30 members of the
judiciary, including the Chief Justice and several members of the Greek Supreme Court, were dismissed.) T h e
grounds for removal in this Act do not include communism; they refer instead to lack of capability, improper conduct, lack of the “necessary moral prestige,”
and “public propaganda in favor of a political side.”
T h e procedures established are left quite vague, but it is
expressly provided that in the three-member committees to be established for each Ministry, one member
should in all cases be an officer.
T h e requirement of filing loyalty statements was
widely regarded by Greek academics as intentionally demeaning and humiliating. However, the country’s troubled political past has conciliated people to such demands and has conditioned them to treat such
requirements as instances of bureaucratic red tape rather
than matters of principle. I t appears that the vast majority of university professors did file the required statements. Still, it was on Constituent Acts IX and X that
the January dismissals were founded; repeating the statutory language, the Minister charged that the persons
concerned had “through their actions placed themselves
in opposition to the social and political regime and its
basic institutions.”
T h e faculty members dismissed, together with an
undetermined number of older professors caught by the
lowering of retirement age decreed in late December,
constitute quite a large proportion of the total proGreece. No clear pattern emerges
fessional body
from an examination of the dismissal lists. T h e elaborate “rea~ons’~
given in the official decision are of
little help-they are vague and repetitious, with intriguing but obscure variations in language. In 46 of the
cases, the express grounds given are political in nature:
professors are charged with “support for a certain political side” (the Center Union party is clearly implied,
although not named) , with “generally following the
communist party line,” and with political bias when
dealing with students. There is no apparent pattem in
terms of academic disciplines: those dismissed on such
charges include professors of medicine, law, architecture,
political science, philology, natural sciences, and economics. I n the remaining 10 cases, the charges are nonpolitical on their face: a leading legal historian is charged
with rudeness to his students, several doctors are accused of profiteering in the sale of their books to students, and other professors are charged with “improper
private conduct” or “arrivisme.” T h e list includes several eminent names in each field-nearly two-thirds of
the dismissed are full professors.
T h e review of personal dossiers and the decisions on

the dismissals were made by a committee whose membership remains secret; it is said to have been composed
of junior officers. N o hearing was granted to those involved before the decisions were taken. I t was announced later that procedures would be set up for
review of individual cases; the Premier stressed his willingness to forgive and reinstate those who sincerely r e
pent their past transgressions and affirm their loyalty to
the regime. Such procedures were established, slowly
and with obvious reluctance. But, as of July 1968, no
actual review of dismissals had been undertaken and,
therefore, no reinstatements had been announced.
Not only professors, but students as well, are now
required to affirm and prove their loyalty and are rewarded or penalized for their political opinions. In
1967, students applying for admission to universities
and other schools were required to request local police
authorities to file certificates of loyalty on their behalf
(the content of such certificates is normally not communicated to the applicants). I t is expressly provided
in the related decree that those found disloyal are not
to be included in the official lists of entrants, regardless
of their performance in the entrance examinations. In
June 1968, it was briefly announced, on the basis apparently of a mere circular of the Ministry of Education,
that no loyalty certificates would be required for 1968
entrants. T h e actual scope of this change in practice is
not clear. T h e military regime has gone even further in
its concern for the political opinions of Greek university students. In an early statute, enacted in June 1967,
it was decreed that students possessing “high convictions and irreproachable morals and character,” as certified by their school principals and after further selection by administrative committees, are to be admitted
in derogation of the set admission numbers and regardless of their performance at the entrance examinations.
I t is not known, however, whether any students were
in fact admitted under this provision.
T h e potentially most farreaching of the military govemment’s measures regarding the universities is the
issuance of two constituent acts conceming the election
of university professors. Until now, professors have been
elected by the full faculty of each school or department,
with only full (“ordinary”) professors voting, and have
been officially appointed by the Minister of Education.
T h e Minister’s action was wholly formal in character:
h e had no choice but to implement the university authorities’ decision. This state of affairs is now radically
changed; the precise history of the related legislation
is in itself of some interest.
In October 1967, Constituent Act XI, “concerning
the election of professors of institutions of higher learning,” was enacted and published in the Official Gazette.
But it was never released to the press (which was until
recently forbidden to report the contents of the Official

Gazette, unless specifically directed by the government)
and was never mentioned in public by any government
official. Just before Christmas, a new constituent act
was passed repealing the earlier act; in contrast, this
was widely publicized. W h a t happened in the meantime is anybody’s guess. Some changes in the composition of the Cabinet had occurred; pressures were probably exerted by academics and others on their behalf.
T h e new act can be said to be an improvement, in that
it does not violate university autonomy as openly as
the earlier one; however, the intended effect of both
acts is unmistakably the same, namely, the control of
university appointments by the government.
Constituent Act XI, the earlier one, provided for the
election of professors and other faculty members by a
special “council of elector professors” consisting of the
dean and one-third of the School’s full professors, plus
an equal number of full professors from other schools,
all named by the government at its complete discretion.
When, as happens in most cases, there were more than
one candidate for a position, the electoral council would
“ e l e ~ t ’not
~ one but two candidates and would leave
the final choice to the Minister-who, it was expressly
stated, could refuse to appoint either and order the
entire proceedings repeated.
Constituent Act X V , enacted in ’December, amended
this election procedure. Elections are now to be conducted, during a first stage, in more or less the traditional manner, by the full professors in each school.
But the election must be completed within a single
meeting of the faculty; if, after two votes, none of the
candidates receives an absolute majority, a final vote
is taken for appointment to a temporary position. If
that vote too is fruitless, the government can step in
\and appoint at its own discretion one of the candidates
for a three-year term.
Even if a candidate is elected by an absolute majority,
however, he can still be stopped. T h e Cabinet may, if
it judges the election of a professor “unsuccessful in
substance or insufficiently supported,” remand it for revision to a special council of electors, constituted in the
same manner as that in the earlier act, with a limitation
on the number of its members who cannot now exceed
a total of 11. T h e Minister also appoints the two rapporteurs. Presumably, the Minister cannot refuse to
appoint the person elected by this council, but it is
difficult to see how an “undesirabIe” couId pass such a
series of hurdles, unless he happens to have full and
continuing support from every single faculty member
in the school.
T h e government may further appoint university professors at its discretion in two special cases: first, on
proposal of the Minister of Education, the government
may appoint an unlimited number of permanent adjunct professors, attached to already. existing and occupied university chairs. Such professors possess all the
rights and privileges of full professors, with the sole
September 1968 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 23

exception of the right to vote in university elections.
They may presumably participate in and vote with
respect to all other university affairs. Second, by a
similar procedure, full professors of Greek origin a t foreign universities may be appointed to vacant chairs at
Greek universities. In both cases, the Minister may act
only after the relevant school has given its opinion on
the matter. But only an %opinionis required, not a
favorable opinion, and even less the school’s initiative;
even a contrary opinion of the School would satisfy
the act’s formal requirement and the appointment
could go through.
In the earlier constituent act, only the provision on
professors from foreign universities was included. T h e
later version added the institution of adjunct professors
and set a time limit to invitations from abroad: such
invitations may now be extended only for one year
after publication of the act. Presumably, the university’s future autonomy is thus preserved although time
limits have been known to be extended; only its present
independence is sacrificed.
Several provisions of the earlier, now repealed, con,stituent act are repeated in the later one. Both provide
that voting in all academic elections is open: the minutes must contain full explanation and justification for
each vote. But the later act also contains new provisions of considerable importance on a number of issues:
T h e professors’ task: with admirable conciseness, i t
is stated: “The main mission of professors of institutions of higher learning consists in their teaching, research, and writing.” T h e provision is not as gratuitous
as it sounds; it should be related to the various grounds
for purging listed above as well as to the military junta’s
conception of the universities’ role in the rebirth of the
nation. A partial implementation of this description
may be found in another provision which imposes on
every professor the obligation to publish, within 18
months, “a treatise or manual containing his lectures.”
T h e consequences of disloyalty: “assistant professors”
(as the Greek equivalent of privatdozenten is usually
-and rather incorrectly-translated) who are found
disloyal are deprived of the right t o teach (which they
cannot exercise anyway without special university action) and of their title; they apparently retain their
diploma and doctorate. Some of the January dismissals
were based on this provision.
Further intervention: the act states that the charters
of universities and other institutions of higher education “may be amended by statute.” Since this was
equally true before, this provision must be read to refer
to the procedure for such amendments, rather than to
the form of their final enactment. In the past, university charters could be amended only through procedures
involving active collaboration on the part of the institutions themselves. Now, presumably, the govemment
can unilaterally amend the charters without consulting
the institutions.
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To cap this legal-looking structure, Constituent Act
X V states expressly that no recourse is possible against
any action taken under it before the Council of State
-the nation’s top administrative tribunal, normally
competent to void administrative acts contrary to a
statute or to the Constitution. T h e government thus
remains the sole judge of the meaning of all legal provisions and of the propriety of their application. This
uniform clause, found in most of the recent constituent
acts, is almost refreshing in its candor. After wading
through the legalistic formalism of the other provisions one is brought back to reality by this clear assertion of the prerogatives of power.
THE UNIVERSITIES

Review of the junta’s record of action, with regard
to the universities, places in their proper context Colonel
Papadopoulos’ mobilization call and the dismissal of
the university professors. Far from being contradictory,
these actions are consistent parts of a single pattem.
T h e military government’s relative slowness in asserting
full control over the universities should not be construed either as softness or as lack of interest; it is
rather the strategist’s respect for immediate needs and
established priorities. I t is only after disposing of opposition in the armed forces, where nearly one-fourth of all
officers have been ,dismissed. or “retired,” and the
civil service, where continuing purges are.taking place,
that the military junta has moved in force against the
universities.
T h e legislative measures described have been only a
first step. Since early January, the Prime Minister, the
Deputy Premier, and the Minister of Education have
delivered innumerable speeches at universities, insistently reminding faculty members and students of their
duties to the nation and requiring their specific and
continuing cooperation with the government. A circular
from the Premier’s office in February asked for the universities’ collaboration in setting goals for tlie spiritual
rebirth of the nation; the universities were directed to
designate some faculty members to assist the government in specified areas : intemational relations, political
institutions, social and economic problems, cultural and
artistic questions. Somewhat more indirectly, a campaign has been mounted to have groups of professors
and students tour the countryside and the villages to
discuss the work of the govemment. Still more indirectly, the government has been keeping up wellpublicized pressure on the universities to fill all vacant
professorial chairs and to create new ones. Benevolent
on its face, this insistence must be seen in the light of
the election procedures already described; it can be
realistically understood then as a further step in packing universities with the regime’s favorites.
I t cannot be contested that the militay govemment
has found some ready collaboration from within the
universities. Greek universities have generally been con-

servative institutions and some of their more extremist
(or opportunistic) professors have volunteered their
services to the military. Others have been reluctant to
resist the pressures directly or indirectly exerted by the
government. University professors have thus been visible in their support for and cooperation with the military regime. Early in 1968, the Faculty of Law in Athens
elected three new professors; all three of them were
fairly well known as scholars and their election could
probably be justified on the merits. I t is not irrelevant
to note, however, that two of the new professors, both
elected to public law chairs, were members of the committee on the amendment of the Constitution appointed by the military junta.
At the same time, what is probably a majority of
faculty members and students in Greek universities
have continued to resist, by various methods and to
varying degrees. In late January 1968, just before the
dismissals were announced, a law professor at Thessaloniki lectured on the need for courage and the responsibility of the intellectuals, and developed the theme of
“constitutional law as a technique for political freedom.” About the same time, a young assistant professor
of literature read to his class, in a valedictory meeting,
a long patriotic poem by an eminent contemporary
Greek poet. Both were lustily applauded by their students; in addition to being dismissed, both were placed
under house arrest by the govemment for several days.
In early February, the “resignation” of an eminent
philologist was announced; in a strange sequel, three
other resignations were first announced and then OBcially denied. In most instances, however, the resistance
of academics takes covert forms-it is passive and often
consists in steady refusal to cooperate with the government, usually with nonpolitical excuses.
Student resistance has generally taken different
forms. Greek students are a relatively cohesive and
activist group and their opposition to the regime can
create serious difficulties to it and inspire further defiance among other groups. Youth is the one segment
of the population where the military find not only the
least support but also the least tolerance, partly because
of the proverbial impetuousness of the young, and partly
because young Greeks are not held back by the memory
of the catastrophic civil war, nearly 20 years ago, that
inhibits the activism of so many of their elders. Their
resistance follows patterns similar to those of all underground movements: attempts at clandestine organization, short demonstrations when possible, distribution
of leaflets, writing of slogans on walls and blackboards.
T h e military government‘s reaction to such acts has
been swift and overwhelming. In March 1968, after a
flurry of student demonstrations, the National Technical University of Athens and the University of Thessaloniki were closed down for a few days. T h e top
administrative official at the Technical University was
forced to resign. Hundreds of students were arrested;

most of them were released after a severe beating but
several were held and are to be tried. After ‘reopening,
the universities have been kept under close surveillance:
a single door in each building is open during the day
and the buildings are locked up early in the evening.
T h e harassing of students has continued. In May and
June, one professor and several instructors at the University of Thessaloniki were arrested; they were still being held incommunicado in mid-July.
In conceming itself with the universities, the military regime has in part responded to acts of resistance
but it is also attempting to achieve several objectives
of its own, immediate as well as long-range. The universities and their faculties enjoy high prestige in
Greece, and this makes them especially attractive targets
for the status-conscious colonels of the Revolutionary
Council, particularly since the respectability of academic institutions can be put to practical uses, through
appointment of faculty members to “nonpolitical” posts
on commissions and ministries. Moreover, control of
the university faculties permits easier and more extensive control of their students. T h e latter can be, and
have been, controlled by the police, but there are obvious advantages for the regime in their being held in
check by the university authorities themselves.
Apart from such particular objectives, there is a deeper reason for the military regime’s concem with control
of the universities-and this is why the junta’s attack
threatens Greek higher education in its very substance
and spirit. W h a t is involved is not merely a wish to
place a few friends on university faculties; i t is not even
a simple question of stifling the criticism of obstreperous academics. It is rather an attempt at wholesale subversion of the academic process with the purpose of
converting it to uses contradictory to the fundamental
nature of a university. T h e ultimate objectives sought
may be perceived in the brief quotations from Papadopoulos’ speech at the University of Thessaloniki. The
junta is committed to a radical and massive re-education of the Greek people as a necessary condition for
the “rebirth” of the Greek nation. As the colonel’s
chosen example clearly suggests, the commitment to a
moral order and to national ideas implies for him a
total rejection of the social, political, and cultural effects
and preconditions of modernization-although the goal
of economic development is supposed to be retained.
W h a t the military deeply and pathetically desires is a
return to traditional values, more precisely to the traditionalist authoritarian culture of an agrarian society
long past. Schools and universities endanger such goals
through their emphasis on youth, their encouragement
of critical attitudes, and their nurturing of modern conceptions. They must, therefore, be controlled, so that
they may indoctrinate students in the “revolutionary”
govemment’s ideals, or so that, at the very least, they
remain passive producers of technically competent but
socially and politically inactive graduates.
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